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THE 0'RI.E(ER&0 0E'RETS SEEN
THROUGH THE SPYGLASS: THE GCHQ
AND THE INTERNATIONAL RIGHT TO
JOURNALISTIC EXPRESSION
INTRODUCTION
he Edward Snowden1 leaks Q“Snowden leaks”P painted a
clear picture of contemporary government surveillance
and data storage. While government-sanctioned warrantless
hoarding of personal data was once thought of as a problem ex-
clusive to those intrusiveO “freedom-hating” governments of the
world, the Snowden leaks pulled back the curtain and painted a
very different picture.2 The Snowden leaks revealed that several
nations, up until the date of the historic article published by The
Guardian in the summer of 2013, that were perceived as rela-
tively strong on issues of personal privacy, had engaged in the
bulk collection of their citiRen’s communications dataO or
“metadataO” as it is sometimes knownK3 The public discovered
1. Glenn Greenwald et al., Edward Snowden: The Whistleblower Behind
the NSA Surveillance Revelations, GUARDIAN (June 11, 2013, 9:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whis-
tleblower-surveillance. The Guardian describes Snowden as:
The individual responsible for one of the most significant
leaks in US political history . . . a 29-year-old former technical
assistant for the CIA and current employee of the defence
contractor Booz Allen Hamilton. Snowden has been working
at the National Security Agency for the last four years as an
employee of various outside contractors, including Booz Allen
and Dell.
Id.
2. Ashley Deeks, An International Legal Framework for Surveillance, 55
VA. J. INT’L L. 291, 293 (2015).
3. Jemima Stratford, The Snowden “Revelations”: Is GCHQ Breaking the
Law? 2014 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 129, 132 (2014); Nicky Woolf, How The
Guardian Broke the Snowden Story, ATLANTIC (July 5, 2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/07/how-i-the-guardian-i-
broke-the-snowden-story/277486/; Greenwald et al., supra note 1. The Guard-
ian, a British Newspaper first published in 1821, grew to achieve national and
international recognition in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.
See Peter Osnos & Clive Priddle, How Britain’s Guardian Is Making Journal-
ism History, ATLANTIC (July 12, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/interna-
T
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that the United States’Bational Security Agency QBSAP and the
United Dingdom’s Government Communications Fead'uarters
(GCHQ) acquired bulk electronic data, which was collected
through the interception of internet, email, and telephone use
and shared that data between one another.4 These electronic
data collection schemes are sub=ect to these nation’s domestic
laws, as well as the international agreements to which they ac-
cede. The United Kingdom is subject to the jurisdiction of the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), where issues that
fall under the scope of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR) are resolved.5
The bulk acquisition of metadata is an issue that the ECtHR
and other European courts6 have explored through the scope of
tional/archive/2011/07/how-britains-guardian-is-making-journalism-his-
tory/241803/; History of the Guardian, GUARDIAN (June 5, 2002),
https://www.theguardian.com/gnm-archive/2002/jun/06/1. While it started as a
weekly paper covering news relevant to the greater Manchester area, it has
now expanded to include extensive digital operations and covers worldwide is-
sues, such as the Julian Assange leaks and the Rupert Murdoch phone and
data hacking scandal. Id.
4. Stratford, supra note 3, at 129@30.
5. The ECtHR is a court that focuses exclusively on issues of human rights
in the nations subject to its jurisdiction. Profile of The European Court of Hu-
man Rights, INT’L JUST. RESOURCECENTER, http://www.ijrcenter.org/european-
court-of-human-rights/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2017). The ECtHR began operat-
ing in 1959 and has delivered more than 10,000 judgments regarding alleged
violations of the ECHR. Id. The ECtHR has jurisdiction to decide complaints
submitted by individuals and States concerning violations of the ECHR, which
principally concerns civil and political rights. Id. It cannot, however, take up a
case on its own initiative. Id. Notably, the person, group or nongovernmental
organization submitting the complaint does not have to be a citizen of a State
Party. Id. Complaints submitted to the ECtHR, however, must concern viola-
tions of the ECHR allegedly committed by a State Party that directly and sig-
nificantly affected the applicant. Id.
6. See EUR. CT. HUM. RTS., FACT SHEET?MASS SURVEILLANCE (2017),
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Mass_surveillance_ENG.pdf [herein-
after Mass Surveillance Fact Sheet].
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Articles 87 and 108 of the ECHR.9 These Articles convey positive
rights to privacy and expression for all persons who fall within
the ECFR’s =urisdictionK10 As stated in a recent case before the
Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT),11 a tribunal created to en-
sure that the United Kingdom meets its international human
rights obligations:
7. The exact language of Article 8 reads:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family
life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no
interference by a public authority with the exercise of this
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is nec-
essary in a democratic society in the interests of national se-
curity, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country,
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and free-
doms of others.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR Art. 8].
8. The exact language of Article 10 reads:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right
shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and im-
part information and ideas without interference by public au-
thority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not pre-
vent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, tel-
evision or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these free-
doms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may
be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or pen-
alties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a demo-
cratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protec-
tion of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for main-
taining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR Art. 10].
9. SeeMass Surveillance Fact Sheet, supra note 6.
10. See ECHR Art. 8, supra note 7; ECHR Art. 10, supra note 8.
11. See General Overview and Background, INVESTIGATORY POWERS
TRIBUNAL, http://www.ipt-uk.com/content.asp?id=10 (last visited Jan. 16,
2017). The IPT describes itself in its own words by stating that:
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Communications data, therefore, comprises, or includes, the
date and time on which a call or electronic communication is
made and received, the parties to it, the apparatus by which it
is made and received and, in the case of a mobile telephone
communication, the location from which it is made and in
which it is received. It can include billing records and sub-
scriber information. Just about the only information not in-
cluded is the content of communications.12
When the ECtFR evaluates states’ alleged violations of free-
dom of expression, it calculates into its holdings a counterbal-
ancing of government interests?often interests of national se-
curity?with the maintenance of a democratic society.13 What
the ECtHR fails to properly take into account in its calculations,
however, is the chilling effect that modern surveillance can have
on =ournalists’ ability to procure confidential sources and
properly convey messages that are essential to the functioning
of a democratic society.14
The Tribunal was established to ensure that the United
Kingdom meets its obligations under Article 13 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). . . . The Tribunal
is an independent court. It decides complaints under the Reg-
ulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) and claims
under the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). It considers alle-
gations of unlawful intrusion by public bodies, including the
Security and Intelligence Agencies (SIAs), the Police and lo-
cal authorities . . . RIPA is the statute and main source of law
that establishes and regulates the power of public bodies to
intrude upon the privacy of members of the public. RIPA pro-
vides an avenue of complaint when these powers are believed
to have been used unlawfully?the Tribunal.
Id.
12. Privacy International v. Secretary of State for Foreign & Common-
wealth Affairs [2016] H.R.L.R. 21, [26].
13. See, e.g., Liberty (The National Council of Civil Liberties) v. GCHQ &
Others [2015] H.R.L.R. 2; Özgür Gündem v. Turkey, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 49
(2000); Valya Filipov, Standards of Protection of Freedom of Expression and
the Margin of Appreciation in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights, 17 COV. L.J. 64, 64@70 (2012).
14. See PEN AM. CENTER, GLOBAL CHILLING: THE IMPACT OF MASS
SURVEILLANCE ON INTERNATIONAL WRITERS 5@6 (2015), http://www.pen-inter-
national.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Global-Chilling_01-05-
15_FINAL.pdf; Emily Bell et al., Comment to Review Group on Intelligence and
Communications Technologies Regarding the Effects of Mass Surveillance on
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This Note will explore the claim that the British government’s
acquisition of metadata stifles the activities of journalists, both
inside and outside of its borders, in contravention of the freedom
of journalistic expression contained within Article 10 of the
ECHR.15 This Note will show that said freedom of journalistic
expression is a pillar of a democratic society that is not justifi-
ably stifled by a countervailing national security interest. Part I
of this Note will explore the historical and social background of
the Snowden leaks, as well as the history of the GCHQ, detailing
what the institution does at present, and the statutory frame-
work under which it operates its acquisition of metadata.16 This
Part will also detail positive and negative reactions from public
and private actors to both the data drop and the actions of the
GCHQ. Part II will discuss the framework used by the ECtHR
when evaluating alleged breaches of the right to freedom of ex-
pression, as well as precedent cases heard in front of both the
ECtHR and the IPT, evaluating claims of Article 8 and 10 viola-
tions brought by individual citizens and international organiza-
tions due to electronic surveillance.17 Part III will then address
the national security interests that advocates of electronic sur-
veillance put forth as justifications that metadata collection is
necessary in a democratic society.18 These advocates of electronic
surveillance posit that surveillance’s ability to prevent loss of
human life and limb outweighs any privacy or freedom of expres-
sion interests.19 This Part will then explore the chilling effect
that electronic surveillance, particularly the collection of
metadataO has on =ournalists’ ability to procure anonymous
the Practice of Journalism, TOWCENTER FORDIGITAL JOURNALISM 1@2 (Oct. 10,
2013), http://towcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Letter-Effect-of-mass-
surveillance-on-journalism.pdf.
15. PEN AM. CENTER, supra note 14, at 5@6; Bell et al., supra note 14, at 1@
2.
16. Stratford, supra note 3, at 12941.
17. See EUR. CT. HUM. RTS., FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN EUROPE: CASE-LAW
CONCERNING ARTICLE 10 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 7@
10 (2007), http://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/DG2/HRFILES/DG2-EN-
HRFILES-18(2007).pdf [hereinafter Freedom of Expression in Europe].
18. Id.
19. Richard A. Epstein, The ECJ’s Final Imbalance: It’s Cavalier Treatment
of National Security Issues Poses Serious Risk to Public Safety and Sound Com-
mercial Practices, 12 E.C.L. REV. 330, 33233 (2016).
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sources and express themselves in a way where they can func-
tion as one of the pillars of a democratic society.20 Finally, Part
IV will set forth a three-part solution that the British govern-
ment can undertake in order to ensure that its agencies, includ-
ing the GCHQ, comport their behavior to better protect the Ar-
ticle 10 journalistic freedom of expression. This solution pro-
poses a new legislative approach to data-gathering, a new philo-
sophical approach to privacy, and a new administrative ap-
proach to judicial oversight for data-gathering agencies like the
GCHQ.
I. THE STATE OFMODERN BRITISH SURVEILLANCE
This Part will examine how the 2013 Snowden leaks affected
public perception of government surveillance in both the United
States and the United Kingdom. This Part will then provide a
brief history of the GCHQ and explore its modern day activities,
with a particular focus on its collection of metadata and inci-
dences of its overreach, which have been chronicled in news ar-
ticles.21 Finally, this Part will provide a detailed discussion on
the primary statutory authority by which the British Parliament
outlined the government collection of metadata, the Regulation
of Investigatory Powers Act of 2000, as well as section 94 of the
Telecommunications Act of <348 Q“section 38”PO another statute
under the authority of which the GCHQ collected metadata.22
A. The Snowden Leaks
In 2013, Edward Snowden, a former contractor for the NSA,
publicly unveiled claims that the NSA conducted an operation of
mass electronic data collection, consisting of several million tel-
ephone records.23 The Guardian published these claims and then
20. See PEN AM. CENTER, supra note 14; Bell et al., supra note 14.
21. Stratford, supra note 3, at 12941.
22. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, LEGISLATION.GOV.UK,
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/contents (last visited Sept. 29,
2017); Telecommunications Act 1984, c. 12, § 94 (Eng.).
23. See Deeks, supra note 2. In 1952, President Harry Truman created the
NSA out of the Armed Forces Security agency, in order “to provide an effective,
unified organization and control of the communications intelligence activities
of the United States conducted against foreign governments.” A Short History
of the NSA, JURIST.ORG (July 22, 2013), http://www.jurist.org/fea-
ture/2013/07/nsa-overview-2.php; Bell et al., supra note 14. In 1975, the U.S
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continued to work with Snowden in a symbiotic relationship,
where Snowden supplied the information and The Guardian
supplied the podium for a mass revelation of the hidden activi-
ties of U.S. and U.K. government-run organizations.24
In response to these leaks, both private and public entities
within the United States shifted their behavior, whether to vo-
cally denounce or support the programs, or to better suit their
actions to what seemed to be an impending clash of privacy and
security based rights.25 One example of the former was a law-
suit26 filed by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)27
Congress discovered that the NSA existed and collected data of both foreign
and U.S entities. Id.
24. Deeks, supra note 2, at 291, 293; Mark Young, National Insecurity: The
Impacts of Illegal Disclosures of Classified Information, 10 ISJLP 367, 367
(2014); Owen Bowcott, GCHQ Spied on Amnesty International, Tribunal Tells
Group in Email, GUARDIAN (July 2, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2015/jul/01/gchq-spied-amnesty-international-tribunal-email; Ewen
MacAskill et al., Mastering the Internet: How GCHQ Set Out to Spy on the
World Wide Web, GUARDIAN (June 21, 2013), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-mastering-the-internet.
25. See Young, supra note 24.
26. ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 792 (2d Cir. 2014); ACLU v. Clapper—
Challenge to NSA Mass Call-Tracking Program, ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/cases/aclu-v-clapper-challenge-nsa-mass-call-tracking-
program (last visited Jan. 16, 2016).
27. ACLU History, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/about/aclu-history (last vis-
ited Jan. 16, 2016). The ACLU is a nonprofit, nonpartisan, and nongovernmen-
tal organization whose mission statement is to continue “to fight government
abuse and to vigorously defend individual freedoms including speech and reli-
gion, a woman’s right to choose, the right to due process, citizens’ rights to
privacy andmuchmore.” Id. The ACLU has historically advocated in what they
viewed as the expansive power of the First Amendment when it comes to free-
dom of speech and freedom of expression in the United States. Id.One example
of this is Reno v. ACLU, where the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the ACLU,
holding that government blanket prohibitions on the transfer of obscene mate-
rials are unconstitutional content-based violations of free speech. Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997).
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against Director of National Intelligence,28 James Clapper,29 al-
leging that the BSA’s call-tracking program violated the Fourth
Amendment developed right to privacy30 and the First Amend-
ment encoded right to freedom of speech.31 The Second Circuit
found in favor of the ACCU’s claim that the USA PATRI2T Act
28. After the attacks on U.S. domestic soil on September 11, 2001, the exec-
utive branch, under the leadership of President George W. Bush, moved to-
wards strengthening its own intelligence capabilities, culminating in the crea-
tion of the Director of National Intelligence position. History, OFF. OF THE
DIRECTOR OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/who-we-
are/history (last visited Oct. 17, 2017). In parallel to the GCHQ, much of the
strengthening of intelligence capabilities was at first done without direct leg-
islative authority. Id. In April 2005, John D. Negroponte was appointed to be
the first Director of National Intelligence. Id.
29. In August 2010, during the presidency of Barack Obama, James Clapper
became the Director of National Intelligence. Biography of James R. Clapper,
LINDSAY GRAHAM, UNITED STATES SENATOR SOUTH CAROLINA, PUBLIC
DOCUMENTS, https://www.lgraham.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/d7b50e0c-
6f70-417d-a8b6-5ab1000bb38a/the-honorable-james-r.-clapper-bio.pdf. (last
visited Oct. 17, 2017). Prior to his service as Director, he worked in a multitude
of active field positions within the Armed forces, in intelligence related posi-
tions within the U.S. Air Force, and as a consultant and advisor for myriad
private and government agencies. Id. Director Clapper is noteworthy for his
testimony before the U.S. Congress in March 2013, where he responded to an
inquiry from Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon, who asked if the NSA, “collect(s)
any type of data at all on millions or hundreds of millions of Americans?”Glenn
Kessler, Clapper’s ‘Least Untruthful’ Statement to the Senate, WASH. POST
(June 12, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-
checker/post/james-clappers-least-untruthful-statement-to-the-sen-
ate/2013/06/11/e50677a8-d2d8-11e2-a73e-
826d299ff459_blog.html?utm_term=.f96509d87eb4; Abby D. Phillip, James
Clapper Apologizes to Congress for ‘Clearly Erroneous’ Testimony, ABC NEWS
(July 2, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/07/james-clapper-
apologizes-to-congress-for-clearly-erroneous-testimony/. Clapper replied that
the agency definitely does not do so wittingly. Id. This statement later brought
outrage from the inquiring senator, the media, and the public, as it seemingly
flew directly in the face of the Snowden leaks brought to light in June of the
same year. Id.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Although the word “privacy” never appears in
the text of the Fourth Amendment, whether the right to be secure in one’s pa-
pers and effects extends to one’s phone communications is, at the very least, a
contested issue under U.S. Supreme Court common law. See, e.g., Monu Bedi,
The Curious Case of Cell Phone Location Data: Fourth Amendment Mash-Up,
110 NW. U. L. REV. 507, 507@10 (2016); David H. Hines, Fourth Amendment
Limitations on Eavesdropping and Wire-Tapping, 16 CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REV.
467, 467 (1967).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. I.; see also MacAskill, supra note 24.
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did not provide for the legality of a bulk telephone metadata col-
lection program, remanding the case to a lower court in order to
answer the questions of constitutionality.32 Other examples of
public outcry in connection with the Snowden leaks include pro-
tests across the United States, with one massive rally occurring
at the nation’s capital of Washington D.C.33
One example of an institutional shift in response to this data
leak was when President Barack Obama ordered James Clapper
to declassify information regarding a portion of the nature and
methodology of the BSA’s bulk data collection under section 501
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.34 In his accompany-
ing statement to these disclosures, Clapper set forth an argu-
ment for the BSA’s program by invoking the agency’s adminisL
trative safeguards and an overriding national security inter-
est.35
B. The History of the GCHQ and its Metadata Collection
The core =ustification for the GCF1’s workO which has been
called “signals intelligence” or “SigintO” first came to rise in the
form of Britain’s Secret Security Bureau in <3I3K36 The overrid-
ing security interest of the time was a fear of German spies, ret-
roactively justified by the first World War, which lasted from
32. See Clapper, 785 F.3d, at 821. According to a report prepared for Con-
gress, “Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act (the Act) in response to the
terrorists’ attacks of September 11, 2001. The Act gives federal officials greater
authority to track and intercept communications, both for law enforcement and
foreign intelligence gathering purposes.” CONGRESSIONAL RES. CENTER, CRS
REPORT FOR CONGRESS 1 (Apr. 18, 2002), https://fas.org/irp/crs/RS21203.pdf.
33. Protestors across the United States and within Washington D.C. itself
gathered soon after the Snowden leaks, endorsing the Fourth Amendment
right of privacy and condemning the NSA’s electronic surveillance programs.
Jim Newell, Thousands Gather in Washington for Anti-NSA ‘Stop Watching
Us” Rally, GUARDIAN (Oct. 26, 2013), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2013/oct/26/nsa-rally-stop-watching-washington-snowden; Re-
becca Bowe, NSA Surveillance: Protestors Stage Restore the Fourth Rallies
Across US, GUARDIAN (July 5, 2013), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2013/jul/04/restore-the-fourth-protesters-nsa-surveillance.
34. Young, supra note 24, at 375; Declassified, DNI Clapper Declassifies In-
telligence Community Documents Regarding Collection Under Section 501 of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), IC on the Record?Office of
the Director of National Security (Sept. 10, 2013), https://icontherecord.tum-
blr.com/post/60867560465/dni-clapper-declassifies-intelligence-community.
35. Young, supra note 24, at 376.
36. MacAskill et al., supra note 24.
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1914 to 1918, and refined by the secondWorldWar, which lasted
from 1939 to 1945.37 The priorities of the GCHQ came into
greater focus during the Cold War, which is commonly under-
stood as the period between the end of the secondWorldWar and
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1991.38 Attention on Moscow was
easily =ustifiedO given the Cold War’s heavy focus away from diL
rect engagement and towards conflicts between proxies and bat-
tles fought by spies over covert intelligence.39 During this time,
and throughout the GCF1’s move to its present home in ChelL
tenham, the agency was acting under no statutory authority
granted from Parliament.40 Finally, in 1994, the Intelligence
Services Act gave the GCHQ a leash from the legislature, albeit
one that kept the agency’s powers and ob=ective obscure and ill-
defined in its legalese.41
37. Id.
38. Id.; Cold War, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/Cold-War
(last visited Sept. 19, 2017).
39. David Barrett, Secret Files Reveal Techniques of Cold War Soviet Spies,
TELEGRAPH (Aug. 21, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/de-
fence/11814627/Secret-files-reveal-techniques-of-Cold-War-Soviet-spies.html;
Lauren Turner, Cambridge Spies: Defection of ‘Drunken’Agents Shook US Con-
fidence, BBCNEWS (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-34596824.
40. The reasoning behind how the GCHQ came to reside in a compound in
Cheltenham, a town in the province of Gloucestershire, England, is long and
somewhat contested. Bob Dormon, INSIDE GCHQ: Welcome to Cheltenham’s
Cottage Industry, REGISTER (May 24, 2013, 7:05 AM), http://www.theregis-
ter.co.uk/2013/05/24/geeks_guide_gchq/. What is certain is that Americans
controlled bases at the two Cheltenham sites during World War II, which were
operated as a communications hub for the European Theatre of Operations. Id.
A staffer from the GCHQ visited the site after the war and promoted it to the
agency in a favorable light. MacAskill et al., supra note 24. The GCHQ then
moved to the area sometime in the early 1950s. Id. The present incarnation of
the compound at Cheltenham is popularly referred to as “the doughnut,” for
the shape of its main building. Id. The area was redone in 2013 and contains
two principle sites with over fifty buildings, many structured to resemble the
buildings of Bletchley park, the historic home to the World War II Enigma
codebreakers. Id.
41. The Intelligence Services Act statutorily defines the GCHQ by stating
that:
There shall continue to be a Government Communications
Headquarters under the authority of the Secretary of State;
and, subject to subsection (2) below, its functions shall be (b)
to provide advice and assistance about?(i) languages, includ-
ing terminology used for technical matters, and (ii) cryptog-
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The Snowden leaks also implicated the GCHQ in the mutual
exchange of metadata.42 The leaked documents revealed a cross-
Atlantic exchange of information in the form of telephone call
recordsO as well as several significant aspects of citiRens’ online
private lives.43 A 2009 memo, which was sent between the direc-
tor in charge of GCHQ’s Mastering the Internet program and a
senior member of the agency’s cyber defense teamO was summaL
rized to the public in a 2013 article in The Guardian, explaining
how the GCHQ collects more metadata than the NSA.44 Further,
the article highlighted the close relationship between the GCHQ
and the NSA, created by the need for transatlantic cooperation
in order to process the substantial volume of metadata.45
The United Kingdom has experienced similar displays of pub-
lic outcry against the collection of metadata.46 There are exam-
ples of political and surveillance experts who refer to proposed
raphy and other matters relating to the protection of infor-
mation and other material, to the armed forces of the Crown,
to Fer Ma=esty’s Government in the United Dingdom or to a
Northern Ireland Department or to any other organisation
which is determined for the purposes of this section in such
manner as may be specified by the Prime Minister.
Intelligence Services Act 1994 § 3, http://www.legisla-
tion.gov.uk/ukpga/1994/13/section/3 (Eng.); MacAskill et al., supra note 24.
42. Stratford, supra note 3, at 132.
43. Id.
44. The Mastering the Internet program, one of the two principal compo-
nents of the GCHQ, involves, amongst other things, the interception of data
leaving and entering the United Kingdom through fiber optics cables owned by
private companies. Ewen MacAskill et al., GCHQ Taps Fibre-Optic Cables for
Secret Access to World’s Communications, GUARDIAN (June 21, 2013, 12:23
PM), https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-
communications-nsa; Kadhim Shubber, A Simple Guide to GCHQ’s Internet
Surveillance Programme Tempora, WIRED (June 24, 2014),
http://www.wired.co.uk/article/gchq-tempora-101; MacAskill et al., supra note
24.
45. MacAskill et al., supra note 24.
46. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, GUARDIAN (Jan. 19, 2009,
8:24 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/libertycen-
tral/2009/jan/14/regulation-investigatory-powers-act; The RIP Act, GUARDIAN
(Oct. 24, 2000, 12:25 PM), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2000/oct/24/qanda.
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eSpansions of the present surveillance program as “totalitarL
ianK”47 MoreoverO there are public media reports of the GCF1’s
overreach in its sweeping capture of emails from the foremost
journalists in the western world, including twenty high-profile
individuals, and human rights groups, such as Amnesty Inter-
national.48
!. TBF N!M7’' 6&_&%&.(Z LA0A&_&A./' 5/HF( &BF RFC%>_&A./ .D
Investigatory Powers Act 2000
British Parliament passed the Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act 200049 (RIPA) in order to, as they stated, allow law
agencies access to current technologies for the purpose of
fighting terrorists and other harmful nonstate agents.50 RIPA
47. Matt Burgess,UKMass Surveillance “Totalitarian’ andWill ‘Cost Lives’,
Warns Ex-NSA Tech Boss, WIRED (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.wired.co.uk/arti-
cle/mass-surveillance-william-binney-nsa-uk-ip-bill.
48. Amnesty International describes themselves as a:
World-embracing movement working for the protection of hu-
man rights. It is independent of all governments and is neu-
tral in its relation to political groups, ideologies and religious
dividing lines. The movement works for the release of women
and men who have been arrested for their convictions, the
colour of their skin, their ethnic origin or their faith?pro-
vided that they have not themselves used force or exhorted
others to resort to violence.
Amnesty International—History, NOBELPRIZE.ORG http://www.no-
belprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1977/amnesty-history.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 16, 2017). See also Matthew Weaver, Security Services Spied on 20
High-Profile People in Questionable Operations, GUARDIAN (July 27, 2016, 9:41
AM) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/27/mi5-and-gchq-spied-on-
20-high-profile-people-in-questionable-operations; Burgess, supra note 47;
James Ball,GCHQCaptured Emails of Journalists from Top International Me-
dia, GUARDIAN (Jan. 19, 2015, 10:04 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2015/jan/19/gchq-intercepted-emails-journalists-ny-times-bbc-guardian-
le-monde-reuters-nbc-washington-post; Bowcott, supra note 24.
49. The year the bill was passed is notable. As stated in a Guardian article
at the time, “[t]he government was keen to push the bill through parliament
before the Human Rights Act became law in October 2000 in order to ensure
that law agencies had a framework for covert surveillance that was compliant
with the European convention on human rights.” Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act 2000, supra note 46.
50. RIPA describes itself and its own purpose in its introductory text. Its
self-stated goal is:
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was passed as a direct response to the adversity with which the
UKDK’s law stood against the ECtFRO as evidenced by cases like
Malone v. United Kingdom.51 In Malone, the petitioner claimed
that it was unlawful for the British government to intercept his
communications without his consent.52 The United Kingdom, in
turn, responded that there was no law that prevented them from
doing so when they had procured a warrant for the purposes of
tapping petitioner’s phoneK53 The ECtHR found in favor of the
petitionerO reasoning that Malone’s ECFR Article 4 privacy
rights had been violated.54 The concurrence highlighted the EC-
tFR’s interest in presiding over a case where the British governL
ment was attempting to become a master over the citiRen’s priL
vate life.55 RIPA passed amidst much controversy, with several
critics claiming that the provisions within the bill did not create
To make provision for and about the interception of commu-
nications, the acquisition and disclosure of data relating to
communications, the carrying out of surveillance, the use of
covert human intelligence sources and the acquisition of the
means by which electronic data protected by encryption or
passwords may be decrypted or accessed; to provide for com-
missioners and a tribunal with functions and jurisdiction in
relation to those matters, to entries on and interferences with
property or with wireless telegraphy and to the carrying out
of their functions by the security service, the Secret Intelli-
gence Service and the Government Communications Head-
quarters.
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Introductory Text,
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/introduction (Eng.); See Regula-
tion of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, supra note 46.
51. Malone v. the United Kingdom, 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. 14 (1985), http://hu-
doc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57533; Laura K. Donohue, Criminal Law: Anglo-
American Privacy and Surveillance, 96 J. CRIM. L. &CRIMINOLOGY 1059, 1164@
66 (2006).
52. Malone v. the United Kingdom, supra note 51; Donohue, supra note 51,
at 1064.
53. Malone v. the United Kingdom, supra note 51, at [61]; Donohue, supra
note 51, at 1064.
54. Malone v. the United Kingdom, supra note 51, at [80]; Donohue, supra
note 51, at 1065.
55. Malone v. the United Kingdom, supra note 51; Donohue, supra note 51,
at 1065.
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sufficient safeguards against abuse and that this system would
result in a series of civil rights violations.56
RIPA distinguishes the interception of the contents of a com-
munication, called content data, from the acquisition of infor-
mation that is extrinsic to the actual contents of a communica-
tion, called communications data.57 The Secretary of State must
issue a warrant in order for an intelligence agency, like the
GCHQ, to legally intercept content data.58 Acquisition of com-
munications data, on the other hand, is the process by which an
applicant receives an authorization from a public authority to
collect traffic data, service use information, or subscriber infor-
mation, either from the relevant communications service pro-
vider or through their own interception of traffic.59
Communications data, also referred to in the public discourse
as “metadataO” is comprised of all of these data types and can
compose the near-entirety of an individual’s onlineO phoneO and
postal communications, with the exception of the actual content
of those messages.60 Traffic data is the information attached to
a communication for the purposes of identifying it within
transit.61 This can include information identifying senders and
recipients of communications, information regarding the physi-
cal location of a device that has sent out a communication, and
surface web-browsing information such as a domain name of a
visited website.62 Service use information is data that conveys
the use made of any communications service by any person.63
56. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, supra note 46.
57. Stratford, supra note 3, at 132.
58. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, c. 1, § 15, http://www.leg-
islation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/part/I/chapter/I/crossheading/unlawful-and-au-
thorised-interception (Eng.).
59. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, c. 2, § 21. Any operator
who provides a postal or telecommunications service shall be considered a com-
munications service provider in the framework of the statute whether they
store their data, process their data, or provide a service completely inside or
partially outside the U.K. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, c. 1, §
2.
60. Stratford, supra note 3, at 132.
61. HOMEOFF., ACQUISITION ANDDISCLOSURE OFCOMMUNICATIONSDATA 15@
18 (Mar. 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/at-
tachment_data/file/426248/Acquisition_and_Disclosure_of_Communica-
tions_Data_Code_of_Practice_March_2015.pdf; Stratford, supra note 3, at 132.
62. HOMEOFF., supra note 61, at 15@18.
63. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, c. 2, § 21.
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Service use information includes data regarding telephone num-
bers an individual has called, timing and duration of internet
service he or she has used, and records of postal items he or she
has sent.64 Subscriber information is data that is held by com-
munications service providers about the person to which they
provide a service.65 Subscriber information includes a communi-
cation service’s account holder’s billing information with the acL
companying details and information regarding the identities of
subscribers in connection with their email address, phone num-
ber, or other information provided to the service.66
The distinction between the interception of content data and
the acquisition of communications data, as detailed within
RIPA, is critical towards an analysis of its compliance with in-
ternational human rights.67 A government agent can procure
communications data much easier than they can content data.68
The authorization required to procure communications data is
still to be issued by the government agent with proportionality
in mind.69 The safeguards around this authorization, however,
amount to less of a safeguard than a warrant requirement.70 Po-
lice officials and GCHQ officials do not need to go through a
=udge or the Secretary of State’s office to obtain authoriRationsO
but instead must request one from a designated member of their
own organization.71
RIPA was created, in part, to address the disparity between
the British government’s surveillance schematic and the standL
ards that the ECHR demands, as evidenced inMalone.72 Accord-
ingly, the legislation creates several legal safeguards, such as
64. Id.; HOMEOFF., supra note 61, at 19.
65. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, c. 2 § 21; HOMEOFF., supra
note 61, at 20.
66. HOMEOFF., supra note 61, at 14.
67. Stratford, supra note 3, 132.
68. Id.
69. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, c. 2, § 21.
70. Stratford, supra note 3, 132.
71. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, c. 2, § 21; Ball, supra note
48.
72. Malone v. the United Kingdom, supra note 51, at [61]; Donohue, supra
note 51, at 1059, 1064.
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judicial and oversight functions, including the IPT as an availa-
ble recourse for legal complainants.73 These oversight safe-
guards, however, have received criticism, as the IPT has seldom
ruled in favor of a claimant bringing suit against the government
agencies conducting surveillance.74
RIPA’s provisions on communications data do not make any
special procedural exception for privileged or confidential infor-
mation held or exchanged by business professionals or journal-
ists.75 Parliament’s Ac'uisition and Zisclosure of Communica-
tions Zata Code of Practice Q“Code of Practice”PO76 published in
2015, however, partially addresses this problem of vulnerable
confidential information.77 Applicants for authorizations for
metadata that they know to belong to journalists, or other hold-
ers of confidential information, must claim as much on their ap-
plication.78 The Code of Practice then mandates that the public
interests of the free press must be accounted for in a proportion-
ality test, against the overriding government interest at hand.79
Those applicants who are seeking communications data specifi-
cally for the purpose of identifying a =ournalist’s sources must
undergo a more thorough procedure, where they apply to a court
for a production order.80 This judicial approval, however, comes
after the agency’s own evaluation that the data sought falls
within the bounds of what is exceedingly likely to determine a
journalistic source.81
b. TBF N!M7’' !.>>FJ&A./ .D !.00%/AJ_&A./' b_&_ 5/HF(
Section 94 of the Telecommunications Act of 1984
The GCHQ, as well as MI5, also collect and hold communica-
tions data outside of the legal framework of RIPA by relying on
73. General Overview and Background, INVESTIGATORY POWERS TRIBUNAL,
http://www.ipt-uk.com/content.asp?id=10 (last visited Jan. 16, 2017).
74. Donohue, supra note 51, at 1171.
75. HOMEOFF., supra note 61, at 4548.
76. This disclosure issues non-binding instructions from Parliament to the
U.K.’s executive agencies on how they are supposed to implement the data-





81. Id. at 47.
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section 94.82 Section 94 allows the Secretary of State to give di-
rections to individuals, including providers of electronic commu-
nications networks, as long as those directions appear to the Sec-
retaryO “to be necessary in the interests of national security or
relations with the government of a country or territory outside
the United DingdomK”83 At the time of its enactment in 1984,
section 94 allowed the Secretary of State to work with the tele-
com industries in a world where there were few networked com-
puters and a smaller potential for sweeping data collection.84
Since then, intelligence agencies, including the GCHQ, have
used section 94 to procure directions from Secretaries of State in
order to acquire bulk communications data from both foreign
and domestic electronic service providers.85 The GCHQ charac-
terizes its bulk communications data in line with the definition
of communications data within the RIPA framework. This data,
however, is treated as though it were obtained pursuant to the
RIPA provisions regarding the interception of content data.86
82. Privacy International [2016] 21 H.R.L.R., [19]; see Amberhawk Train-
ing, Here’s the Little-Known Legal Loophole that Permitted Mass Surveillance
in the UK, REGISTER (Nov. 9, 2015) http://www.theregis-
ter.co.uk/2015/11/09/hawktalk_wip/.
83. Telecommunications Act 1984, § 94(1), § 94(8), http://www.legisla-
tion.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/12/section/94 (Eng.).
84. See Amberhawk Training, supra note 82.
85. In response to a lawsuit against them claiming, amongst other things,
that the GCHQ’s collection of bulk communications data under section 94 was
unlawful, the GCHQ provided the IPT with an account of their relevant oper-
ations, stating that:
[In 1998 and then regularly] since 2001, GCHQ has sought
and obtained from successive Foreign Secretaries a number
of § 94 directions relating to the ongoing provision of various
forms of bulk communications dataK In keeping with GCF1’s
external intelligence mission, the datasets received under
these directions are predominantly foreign-focused, and the
data acquired is accordingly in most cases only a fraction of
that possessed by the WPECB’sVK
Privacy International [2016] H.R.L.R. 21, [10].
86. Id.
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II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK BEHIND ECHR CLAIMS AGAINST
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 10
The ECHR can, and should, be the mechanism by which courts
analyze electronic surveillance schemes like those created by
RIPA and section 94. This Part will demonstrate, piecemeal, how
the ECHR treats freedom of expression when it is, arguably,
threated by an electronic surveillance program. Through the
course of the ECFR’s =urisprudence regarding mass surveilL
lance, courts have chosen to balance the rights inherent in Arti-
cle 10, including freedom of journalistic expression, against
countervailing government interests.87 This Part will evaluate
the legal framework used in finding governments’ violations of
Article <I’s guarantee of freedom of eSpressionK ThenO this Part
will highlight several cases that demonstrate the criteria under
which the ECtHR and IPT evaluate claims that a government
surveillance program violates either Article 4’s right of privacy
or Article <I’s right to freedom of eSpressionK88 Taken together,
this will demonstrate both the weighing of interests inherent in
an Article 10 analysis, and the connection between privacy and
expression that exists where electronic surveillance claims arise.
A. The Legal Framework of Article 10 Claims Alleging
Violations of Freedom of Expression
There are three criteria that European courts have applied to
measure whether a government interference with an individ-
ual’s freedom of eSpression breaches Article <IK89 The law or ac-
tion that restricts expression must be done in pursuit of a legit-
imate government interest, it must be prescribed by law, and the
restriction must be necessary in a democratic society.90
The ECtHR has determined what suffices as a legitimate gov-
ernment interest through case law.91 Governments often argue
national security as a justification for their surveillance activi-
ties, which the ECtHR usually accepts as a valid government
interest.92 It is not sufficient, however, that there be a legitimate
87. Freedom of Expression in Europe, supra note 17, at 7.
88. ECHR Art. 8, supra note 7; ECHR Art. 10, supra note 8.
89. Freedom of Expression in Europe, supra note 17, at 710.
90. Id.
91. See id.
92. Id. at 7.
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government interest in order to supersede a breach of an indi-
vidual’s freedom of eSpressionK93 The government action must ei-
ther be prescribed by law or supported by some legal basis for
any restriction of expression.94 This legal basis first must be
found within domestic law, to which the government must
obey.95 The law in question must also contain a measure of ac-
cessibility and foreseeability, so that individuals may ensure
that they are not deprived of their freedom of expression un-
fairly.96
The final criteria is that any restriction on freedom of expres-
sion must be necessary in a democratic society.97 The strength of
the government interest is weighed against the suppression of
freedom of expression in order to determine whether the govern-
ment is meeting a pressing social need.98 The value of national
security interests, mentioned in Article 10, has often been cited
as supplying governments with a claim that an infringement on
freedom of expression is necessary in a democratic society.99
While states are given leewayO under the “margin of appreciaL
tionO” to determine what 'ualifies as a necessity in a democratic
society, it is ultimately up to the ECtHR to evaluate the strength
of the interests at hand.100 It is through this three-part test?
legitimate government interest, prescribed by law, and neces-
sary in a democratic society?that the court ruled in favor of the
freedom of the Austrian press to defame politicians without fine
imposition, 101 the freedom of a German citizen to defame judges
for their ruling in a sensitive political case without conviction,
93. Id. at 8.
94. Id. (citing Herczegfalvy v. Austria, judgment of 24 September 1992, Se-
ries A No. 244).
95. Telegraaf Media Nederland Landelijke Media B.V. v. The Netherlands,
34 B.H.R.C. 193 at [90] (2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-114439.
96. Id.
97. Freedom of Expression in Europe, supra note 17, at 9.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. As stated in a report on the ECHR, “[t]he member states have some dis-
cretion (0margin of appreciation’) in assessing the existence of such a need. That
margin is subject to European review, however, the extent of which will vary
according to the case.” Id.
101. See Lingens v. Austria, Application no. 9815/82, (1986) 8 Eur. H.R. Rep.
407, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57523.
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102 and the freedom of several British newspapers to publish or
disclose extracts from the memoirs of a former member of the
British Security Services. 103
B. The Legal Framework Behind ECHR Claims Against
Electronic Surveillance
Even before Malone, the ECtHR recognized the need for both
an element of transparency and an imminent state security in-
terest in order to find a surveillance system in compliance with
law and Article 8.104 In Klass v. Federal Republic of Germany, in
the context of a communications interception scheme, the court
found German law was not in violation of Article 8 where au-
thorities were required to notify citizens of the interception after
the fact and, where there is an imminent danger to state secu-
rity, other methods of obtaining the information are unavailable,
and the surveillance ceases as soon as the other conditions are
no longer met.105
Another case, Weber & Saravia v. Germany, represented a
landmark decision in ECtHR surveillance jurisprudence with re-
gards to both ECHR Articles 8 and 10.106 The ECtHR found that
102. See Barthold v. the Federal Republic of Germany, Application No.
8734/79, (1985) 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 383, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
57432.
103. The 1987 book, Spycatcher, written by Peter Wright, a retired member
of British Security Services, experienced widespread publication and commer-
cial success in the United States, while British newspapers, including The Ob-
server and The Guardian, were barred from publishing excerpts of the novel.
See Edwin McDowell, 0Spycatcher,’ Banned at Home, Thrives in U.S., N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 1, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/08/01/books/spycatcher-
banned-at-home-thrives-in-us.html. The British Security Services had, embed-
ded in their practices, a culture of secrecy, which Britain’s highest court effec-
tuated when they initially held that British papers could not print excerpts of
Spycatcher, following the U.K.’s argument that Peter Wright violated the Offi-
cial Secrets Act, and his obligation of confidentiality, when he wrote the book.
See The Observer and The Guardian v. United Kingdom, (1992) 14 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 153 (holding that an injunction against the newspapers to prevent their
publication of Spycatcher excerpts was in breach of Article 10, reasoning that
the full publication of the novel in the United States made the government aim
unnecessary and nonlegitimate).
104. Donohue, supra note 51, at 1059.
105. Id. (citing Klass v. Federal Republic of Germany, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 214
(1980)).
106. 46 SE5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 47 (2008).
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protection against international terrorism was a sufficient justi-
fication to find no breach of petitioners’ Article 4 and <I rightsO
where the German government intercepted the contents of their
communications.107 The interception program became effective
in order to identify issues of national security based on the in-
terception of telecommunications containing specific keywords
regarding hot button issues.108 The ECtHR recognized the mar-
gin of appreciation that governments are given in the service of
defining a national security interest as necessary in a demo-
cratic society.109 The Court also took note of safeguards against
abuse that could strengthen a government’s caseO where they
had not acted in violation of this criteria.110 The German pro-
gram was found to be sufficiently foreseeable and to have ade-
quate safeguards to qualify as appropriate under these stand-
ards with regards to general interception of communications.111
One petitioner, a high-profile journalist, also argued that a
breach of her Article 10 right had occurred due to the govern-
ment collection of information regarding her confidential
sources.112 The ECtHR found that, where targeted interception
of a =ournalist’s data was not specifically for the purpose of disL
covering his or her confidential sources, safeguards that satisfy
the requirements of Articles 8 and 10 suffice to maintain the in-
tegrity of these sources.113
In contrast withWeber, the ECtHR, in Telegraaf Media Neder-
land Landelijke Media BV & Others v. Netherlands, found that
the Betherland’s secret service violated ECFR Articles 4 and <I
where they intercepted communications of a newspaper in order
to circumvent the protection of a journalistic source.114 The EC-
tHR stated that the fact that government authorities had specif-
ically targeted their surveillance on journalists for the express
purpose of discovering a confidential source gave rise to a need
for advanced safeguards or more proof of an overriding public
107. Id. at 6169, 7276.
108. Id. at 5154.
109. Id. at 66.
110. Id. at 63.
111. Id. at 6169.
112. Id. at 74.
113. Id. at 7476.
114. 34 B.H.R.C. 193 at [80] (2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
114439.
282 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 43:1
interest.115 While this is a recent case of the ECtHR upholding
Article 10 interests against surveillance operations, the
measures taken here were targeted towards content data, thus
distinguishable from Weber & Saravia.116
In LA^F(&Z XTBF N_&’> Council of Civil Liberties) v. GCHQ, the
IPT, in its evaluation of the communications interceptions sys-
tem under RIPA, attached theWeber criteria to the protection of
metadata.117 The tribunal found, however, less of a strict adher-
ence to safeguards necessary where the data acquired was
merely the communications data used to identify those individ-
uals whose content data had been intercepted.118
In 8(A$_JZ I/&’> $. 6FJ’Z of State for Foreign Affairs & Ors, the
IPT found that the GCHQ could, in accordance with ECHR Ar-
ticle 8, utilize the section 94 Secretary of State directions in or-
der to lawfully collect bulk communications data outside of
RIPA’s statutory frameworkK119 The IPT found that no legisla-
tion had served to repeal or override section 94 since its passage
as law. The ITP reached that conclusion by finding that nothing
within the text of section 80 of RIPA should be construed as prej-
udicing any lawful power to obtain information in ways not spec-
ified by RIPA.120 In exploring what a lawful collection regime un-
der section 94 would look like, the ITP focused heavily on the
foreseeability of interferences with privacy,121 evaluating what
is reasonable when the government acts in the interests of na-
tional security, without requiring measures to the extent that
any individual can predict whenever authorities are likely to ac-
quire his or her communications data.122 The GCHQ had been in
breach of this foreseeability requirement by its use of section 94
to collect bulk communications data for over a decade, as it used
the loopholes in this decades-old statute to engage in modern
data gathering practices.123 The ITP ultimately decided, how-
ever, that recent safeguards put into place, as well as newfound
115. Id. at [97][101].
116. Id. at [96][97].
117. [2015] H.R.L.R. 2, [114].
118. Id.
119. [2016] H.R.L.R. 21, [26].
120. Id. at [40].
121. Id. at [59], [70].
122. Id.
123. Id. at [59], [70].
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public awareness of the section 94 regime, sufficed to find the
GCHQ within the bounds of Article 8.124
III. THE ARTICLE 10 ENCODED FREEDOM OF JOURNALISTIC
EXPRESSION
Alongside the jurisprudence surrounding electronic surveil-
lance, Article 10 also covers the right to journalistic freedom of
expression. This Part will delve into the damage that the
GCF1’s collection of metadata has on =ournalistic freedom of eSL
pression under Article 10. It will analyze the government inter-
est of national security against the interference of journalistic
expression as components of what is necessary in a democratic
society. It will then weigh the claims of an overriding national
security interest made by proponents of the collection of
metadata with a counterargument to those claims, which under-
cuts the effectiveness of metadata collection as an effective
method of preventing public harm. It will also briefly examine
Article 10 itself and how the freedom of journalistic expression
is a necessary pillar of a democratic society. This Part will then
demonstrate how metadata collection, such as that done by the
GCF1O stifles eSpression by interfering with =ournalists’ ability
to procure anonymous sources. Finally, this Part will demon-
strate how metadata collection also stifles journalistic expres-
sion by creating a chilling effect that interferes with =ournalists’
ability to freely express controversial ideas, which the public
may need to hear.
A. The Alleged Necessity of Metadata Collection in the Interests
of National Security
Supporters of metadata collection argue that it is a justifiable
potential infringement on Article 8 and 10 rights, since protec-
tion of national security is a legitimate government aim and nec-
essary in a democratic society.125 The Intelligence and Security
Agencies of Britain exist and justify their existence, in large
part, to protect the country from breaches of national security
124. Id. at [94].
125. Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Privacy and Secu-
rity: A Modern and Transparent Legal Framework, 2015, HC 1075, ¶ 10 [here-
inafter Committee Report]; Freedom of Expression in Europe, supra note 17 at
7@10.
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through the use of their intelligence gathering programs.126 Sup-
porters of metadata collection claim that metadata is essential
for agencies’ abilities to develop leads on dangerous individuals
and to identify potentially dangerous associations or networks of
communication.127 These mechanisms of identification, it is ar-
gued, are more vital in this age, as growing terrorist threats may
be preempted through communications data identification.128
Much is made of the fact that, in a world where these threats
must be identified, metadata acquisition is at least less intrusive
than the interception of content data.129 Some consider an ap-
proach to surveillance that affords greater respect to privacy and
expression to be misguided.130 Arguments with much force come
out of the enormous cost of individual terrorist attacks when
compared against the seemingly less tangible cost of intrusions
upon privacy or expression.131
These arguments heralding the strength of the relevant na-
tional security interests have, however, been met with criti-
cism.132 There are those who have pointed to the ongoing march
of technology as cause for an erosion of the distinction between
metadata, which has less procedural protections, and content
data, which has more.133 Communications data in the internet
age can create a nearly complete profile of an individual’s lifeK134
While some argue the difference between metadata and content
data is still meaningful, they also must deal with the wide and
sweeping nature of metadata acquisition.135 Experts contend
that sweeping surveillance techniques, such as communications
data acquisition, produce wide and deep privacy intrusions, with
far less of a security benefit than targeted surveillance.136 Re-
search suggests that mass collection of communications data is
not only ineffective at preventing individual acts of terror, but
126. Committee Report, supra note 125, ¶ 13.
127. Id. ¶ 10.
128. Id. ¶ 10.
129. Id. ¶ 140.
130. Epstein, supra note 19, at 33233.
131. Id. at 33034.
132. See Martin Scheinin, Towards Evidence-Based Discussion on Surveil-
lance: A Rejoinder to Richard A. Epstein, 12 E.C.L. REV. 341, 34748 (2015).
133. Committee Report, supra note 126, ¶ 50.
134. Id. ¶¶ 130, 138.
135. Scheinin, supra note 132.
136. Id.
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that collection of an abundance of noncontent data can mislead
law officers and even obfuscate proper leads.137
B. Journalistic Expression is a Recognized Pillar of a
Democratic Society
The ineffective form of security procured through metadata
collection is outweighed by the countervailing interest of jour-
nalistic expression. Article 10 of the ECHR is a guarantee to the
people of those nations that accede to the ECHR that their right
to express themselves will be protected above and beyond the
authority of the sovereign state in which they live.138 These prin-
ciples were considered so sacrosanct by the international com-
munity that, in the aftermath of the Snowden leaks, the United
Bation’s Fuman Rights Council declared that:
In order for individuals to exercise their right to privacy in com-
munications, they must be able to ensure that these remain
private, secure and, if they choose, anonymous. Privacy of com-
munications infers that individuals are able to exchange infor-
mation and ideas in a space that is beyond the reach of other
members of society, the private sector, and ultimately the State
itself. Security of communications means that individuals
should be able to verify that their communications are received
only by their intended recipients, without interference or alter-
ation, and that the communications they receive are equally
free from intrusion. Anonymity of communications is one of the
most important advances enabled by the Internet, and allows
individuals to express themselves freely without fear of retri-
bution or condemnation.139
In response to this, the United Nations General Assembly
passed Resolution 64J<65O which stressesO in partO “the imL
137. Committee Report, supra note 125, ¶ 137; Scheinin, supra note 132.
138. ECHR Art. 10, supra note 8.
139. Frank La Rue (Special Rapporteur), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on
the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expres-
sion, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/27 (May 16, 2011). The United Nation’s Human
Rights Council is a branch of the U.N. General Assembly, comprised of forty-
seven U.N. Member States and charged with overseeing human rights issues,
including the strengthening of existing human rights protections and the res-
olution of present human rights violations. About The Human Rights Council,
U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF., http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/pages/hrcin-
dex.aspx, (last visited Jan. 16, 2017).
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portance of the full respect for freedom to seek, receive and im-
part information, including the fundamental importance of ac-
cess to information and democratic participationK”140
One also need not look very hard to find that the integrity of
journalistic freedom of expression is both logically and histori-
cally bound to the greater right of expression, which is treasured
in these and other declarations of human rights.141 Those na-
tions across the globe who hold themselves to democratic princi-
ples often hold freedom of the press as the epitome of the values
of open communication and discourse.142
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution also expressly
provides thatO “Congress shall make no law K K K abridging the
freedom of speechO or of the pressK K K K”143 The U.S. Supreme
Court has applied the First Amendment to protect the right of
citizens to freely express themselves,144as well as the right of the
140. G.A. Res. 68/167, pmbl., The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age (Jan.
21, 2014). The United Nations depicts its own history and mission statement
as follows:
Established in 1945 under the Charter of the United Nations,
the General Assembly occupies a central position as the chief
deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of the
United Nations. Comprising all 193 Members of The United
Nations, it provides a unique forum for multilateral discus-
sion of the full spectrum of international issues covered by
the Charter. It also plays a significant role in the process of
standard-setting and the codification of international law. . .
. The Assembly is empowered to make recommendations to
States on international issues within its competence. It has
also initiated actions?political, economic, humanitarian, so-
cial and legal?which have affected the lives of millions of
people throughout the world.
Functions and Powers of the General Assembly, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/background.shtml (last visited Jan. 16, 2017).
141. Filipov, supra note 13 at 6483.
142. Id.
143. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
144. While the word “expression” is not explicitly found within the First
Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court has found a First Amendment right to
express oneself, not merely within the confines of the spoken word, but where
one asserts their viewpoints into the public discourse. See Barry P. McDonald,
The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards A Realistic
Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249
(2004). See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (striking down a Texas
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press to communicate ideas effectively without undue interfer-
ence from the government.145
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe also
adopted Recommendation No. R (2000) 7, a recommendation to
the Member States of the European Union, which states that
journalists have a right not to disclose their sources of infor-
mation.146 Principle 6 of the Recommendation, in particular, ap-
plies to interception orders, actions concerning communications
or correspondence, and surveillance orders concerning journal-
ists, their contacts, or their employers.147 It states that those
methods cannot be undertaken whereO “WtVheir purpose is to cirL
cumvent the right of journalists . . . not to disclose information
identifying a sourceK”148
It is also evident in the ECtFR’s case law that Article <I places
a premium on journalistic freedom of expression.149 In Özgür
Gündem, the Turkish government was found to be in violation
of Article 10 of the ECHR, as it failed to conduct a widespread
investigation into a concerted campaign of serious attacks
against journalists and others associated with a newspaper com-
pany.150 The ECtHR ruled that the freedom of journalistic ex-
pression was of such significance that it could require a country
to do more than merely refrain from interfering with said
statute banning a person’s right to burn a flag); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976) (upholding a person’s right to contribute money to political campaigns
based on a First Amendment right to express oneself, not merely within the
confines of the spoken word, but where one asserts their viewpoints into the
public discourse).
145. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that
in order for a statement printed by the press about a public figure to be found
illegal under a theory of libel, the statement must be made with actual malice,
or purposeful intent to print a false statement); N.Y. Times v. United States,
403 U.S. 713 (1971) (holding that the publication of classified documents about
the Vietnam War could not be suppressed under a government theory of na-
tional security).
146. Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation No. R
(2000) 7, Of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Right of Jour-
nalists Not to Disclose Their Sources of Information (Adopted by the Commit-




149. Filipov, supra note 13, at 66.
150. Özgür Gündem, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 49, 108687 (2000).
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right.151 There, the Court found an obligation for states to take
positive action to investigate serious allegations that legal au-
thorities may be engaging in interferences with journalistic free-
dom of expression.152 Telegraaf Media Nederland Landelijke Me-
dia BV is a more recent case that highlights the respect with
which the ECtHR gives the freedom of journalistic expression.153
The ECtHR cited legislative declarations, such as Recommenda-
tion No. R (2000) 7, declaring that confidential sources are so
essential to Article 10 principles that there must be an overrid-
ing requirement to the public interest in order to take measures
that would breach that confidentiality.154
!. KF&_H_&_ !.>>FJ&A./ A' _& OHH' ]A&B J.%(/_>A'&'’ NFFH D.(
Anonymous Sources
One of the key components of modern investigative journalism
is a reporter’s ability to access confidential informantsK155 The
routine disclosures of confidential sources with particular in-
sight into the nature of both government and nongovernment
organiRations are essential to a reporter’s role within the demoL
cratic exchange of information.156 “2ff the recordO” deliberate
drops from low-level sources can be mandated from higher ups
within-organizations.157 There are records of government actors
within each branch and on every level of the chain of command
who leak information, ranging from arbitrary gossip to earth-
shattering news.158 Anonymous source disclosures are of such a
151. Özgür Gündem, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 49, 1083 (2000).
152. Id.
153. 34 B.H.R.C. 193 at [60][62], [98][100], [126][128] (2012); http://hu-
doc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-114439.
154. Id. at [60]@[62].
155. SeeMichelle C. Gabriel, Plugging Leaks: The Necessity of Distinguishing
Whistleblowers and Wrongdoers in the Free Flow of Information Act, 40 LOY.
UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 531 (2009); Liberty to Monitor All: How Large-Scale US Sur-
veillance is Harming Journalism, Law and American Democracy, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (2014), https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/07/28/liberty-monitor-
all/how-large-scale-us-surveillance-harming-journalism-law-and; Bell et al.,
supra note 14%MNdNlina CiobanuOResearch Highlights the Impact of the Threat
of Surveillance on Journalists and Their Sources, JOURNALISM.CO.UK (May 31,
2016), https://www.journalism.co.uk/news/research-highlights-the-impact-of-
the-threat-of-surveillance-on-journalists-and-their-sources/s2/a642711/.
156. See Bell et al., supra note 14.
157. Id. at 2.
158. Id. at 2.
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common occurrence and are so vital to the press in the United
States that forty states have shield law statutes that provide
protections for anonymous sources.159 Nine states that do not
have shield laws instead have standing court rulings that pro-
tect anonymous disclosures through the common law system.160
In a world after the Snowden leaks, potential sources in the
United States, United Kingdom, and other countries worldwide,
are now discouraged from coming forth and providing infor-
mation to journalists.161 A comprehensive survey by the Human
Rights Watch and ACLU revealed that the loss of sources is a
prominent concern amongst American journalists.162 Journalists
159. Forty states in the United States now have anonymous source protection
laws, known as “shield laws,” as a part of their state code. Gabriel, supra note
155, at 53132; State-by-State Guide to the Reporter’s Privilege For Student
Media, STUDENT PRESS L. CENTER, http://www.splc.org/article/2010/09/state-
by-state-guide-to-the-reporters-privilege-for-student-media?id=60 (last visited
Jan. 16, 2017) [hereinafter State-by-State Guide].
160. Nine states in the United States have state courts who, through the com-
mon law system, have created protections for anonymous sources without hav-
ing any shield laws in their code. Wyoming is the only state in the union to
have neither a shield law statute nor a common law developed First Amend-
ment protection for confidential sources. See Gabriel, supra note 155; State-by-
State Guide, supra note 159. See, e.g., In re Wright, 700 P.2d 40 (Idaho 1985);
Waterloo/Cedar Falls Courier v. Hawkeye Community College, 646 N.W.2d 97
(Iowa 2002); Sinnott v. Boston Retirement Board, 524 N.E.2d 100 (Mass. 1988);
Hawkins v. Williams, Civ. No. 2900054 (Cir. Ct. 1st Jud. Dist. Hinds Cty., Mar.
16, 1983); Mississippi v. Hardin, Crim. No. 3858 (Cir. Ct. Yalobusha Cty., Mar.
23, 1983); State of Missouri v. Ely, 954 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1997);
New Hampshire v. Siel, 444 A.2d 499 (N.H. 1982); Hopewell v. Midcontinent
Broadcasting Corporation, 538 N.W.2d 780 (S.D. 1995); State v. St. Peter, 132
Vt. 266 (1974); Brown v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 204 S.E.2d 429 (Va. 1974).
161. With Liberty to Monitor All: How Large-Scale US Surveillance is Harm-
ing Journalism, Law and American Democracy, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 28,
2014), https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/07/28/liberty-monitor-all/how-large-
scale-us-surveillance-harming-journalism-law-and [hereinafter With Liberty
to Monitor All]; Ciobanu, supra note 155.
162. With Liberty to Monitor All, supra note 161. The Human Rights Watch
is a nongovernmental, international organization whose mission statement is,
in their own words, to “scrupulously investigate abuses, expose the facts
widely, and pressure those with power to respect rights and secure justice. Hu-
man Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works
as part of a vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause
of human rights for all.” About Us, HUM. RTS. WATCH,
https://www.hrw.org/about (last visited Oct. 1, 2017). They neither accept gov-
ernment funding in any form nor do they purport to identify with any partisan
group or political party. Id. The Human Rights Watch receives praise for its
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in the survey cited a myriad of potential reasons for the new-
found difficulty in procuring sources.163 The most common rea-
son given was the increased surveillance and thorough crack-
down on journalistic whistle-blowers through the use of the Es-
pionage Act in the Obama Administration.164 Beyond the Obama
Administration’s now liberal use of its own discretion in proseL
cuting sources who fail to comport with the alleged national se-
curity interest, journalists noted that electronic surveillance
now made the discovery of those sources’ identities much easier
for the government.165 The government could potentially be ob-
serving where and when a source was in a given place by storing
and analyzing metadata regarding phones, electronic building
identifications, and publicly used surveillance cameras in con-
cert.166
Journalists now complain that both they, and their sources,
can assume that their every move is potentially under scrutiny
from the government.167 Sources will request to specifically meet
with reporters in their own homes, as opposed to public offices.168
journalism and investigatory abilities, despite not operating under the purview
of traditional news media organizations. Dan Gilmor, In Praise of The Almost
Journalists, SLATE (Mar. 28, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/technol-
ogy/future_tense/2014/03/human_rights_watch_and_other_advo-
cacy_groups_doing_great_journalism.html.
163. With Liberty to Monitor All, supra note 161.
164. Id. The U.S. Executive Branch, under president Barack Obama, has
been infamously harsh on administrating punishment for those individuals
who expose classified information in the perceived interest of rooting out gov-
ernment corruption, abuse, and wrongdoing under the Espionage Act of 1917.
Gunar Olsen, Obama’s Crackdown on Whistleblowers: Petraeus Plea Deal Re-
veals Double Standard for Leaks, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 22, 2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gunar-olsen/obamas-crackdown-on-
whist_b_7109518.html. The Espionage Act of 1917 was passed by U.S. Presi-
dent Woodrow Wilson during World War I for the purpose of imposing harsh
punishments on those individuals who leaked government information that
could be used by German forces in their war effort. Gunar Olsen. Id.; This Day
in History—June 15, 1917: U.S. Congress Passes Espionage Act,” HISTORY,
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/u-s-congress-passes-espionage-act
(last visited Jan. 16, 2017). Violating the Act is a strict liability offense, mean-
ing those found to have definitively been in breach of it cannot mount any de-
fense. Id.
165. With Liberty to Monitor All, supra note 161.
166. Id.; Stratford, supra note 3, at 132; Bell et al., supra note 14, at 14.
167. Bell et al., supra note 14 at 1011.
168. With Liberty to Monitor All, supra note 161; Bell et al., supra note 14, at
14.
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Journalists are changing their reporting practices to account for
the fact that they can no longer confirm even unclassified infor-
mation, such as the previously mentioned routine disclosures.169
D. Metadata Collection Stifles Journalistic Expression Through
a Collective Chilling Effect
Government interception of surface data serves to stifle the
journalists who use electronic communications pathways in or-
der to not only procure information, but to convey that infor-
mation to the public.170 The idea that government surveillance
has a tangible chilling effect on free expression is nothing new.171
Proving that the chilling effect exists presents definite problems
of empirical proof, as it is an exercise in proving the nonexistence
of an action?free expression.172 With the Snowden revelations,
as well as the accompanying international discussion on the na-
ture of government surveillance, researchers are now pushing
surveys in order to supply some tangible data to either prove or
disprove the existence of a chilling effect for both journalists and
laypersons.173
169. With Liberty to Monitor All, supra note 161; Bell et al., supra note 14, at
14.
170. With Liberty to Monitor All, supra note 161; Bell et al., supra note 14, at
1112.
171. See e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (dismissing the plaintiff’s
complaint that the U.S. military data-gathering systems chilled their speech
in violation of their First Amendment rights, reasoning that the plaintiff’s
failed to establish standing); Klass v. Federal Republic of Germany, 2 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 214 (1978) (holding that although plaintiffs had not been specifically wire-
tapped by the German government, their complaint could validly ask for an
evaluation of the German surveillance system as relief because the nature of
the surveillance system was so widespread that they had the standing to do
so); Jonathon W. Penney, Chilling Effects: Online Surveillance and Wikipedia
Use, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 118, 120 (2016).
172. Penney, supra note 171. It is worth noting the counterargument against
the proposition that proving a negative has an inherent difficulty which distin-
guishes it from the task of proving a positive proposition. See Kevin W. Saun-
ders, The Mythic Difficulty in Proving a Negative, 15 SETONHALL L. REV. 277,
277 (1985). It has been posited that the difficulty in proving negative proposi-
tions can stem from other characteristics of the proposition to be proven, such
as the universality or rarity of those characteristics. Id.
173. For one example of a thorough study of individual’s online activities and
how they are markedly changed by the existence of government surveillance
systems, see Penney, supra note 171.
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The atmosphere created by government surveillance has a tan-
gible effect on howwriters and journalists around the world view
their freedom of expression.174 Cevels of writers’175 discomfort
with government surveillance is nearly as high in liberal demo-
craticO “free”176 countries as it is in nondemocratic countries with
histories of state surveillance.177 Writers in the five nations that
comprise the “Hive Eyes” countriesO one of which is the United
Kingdom, particularly share this heightened level of concern.178
174. A 2015 survey conducted by the PEN American Center polled writers
living in fifty different countries to gauge how government surveillance influ-
ences their attitudes towards freedom of privacy and expression, as well as how
those attitudes effect their journalistic practices. See PEN AM. CENTER, supra
note 14.
175. The term “writers” is defined in the PEN report based on how the re-
spondents chose to style themselves. PENAM. CENTER supra note 14, at 7. This
report included fiction, nonfiction, academic, creative, and journalistic sources.
Id.; see Methodology, Freedom in the World (2015), FREEDOM HOUSE
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2015/methodology (last visited
Jan. 16, 2017).
176. See Methodology, Freedom in the World (2015), supra note 175.
177. Of the 772 respondents, 82 percent described themselves as writers, and
of that group, 22 percent described themselves as journalists. PENAM. CENTER,
supra note 14, at 7. The term “free” is defined in the PEN report as those coun-
tries that qualify as liberal democracies by the criteria of Freedom House,
which is a nongovernmental watchdog organization. See Methodology, Free-
dom in the World (2015), supra note 175. Freedom House grades countries on
seven criteria?electoral process, political pluralism and participation, func-
tioning of government, freedom of expression and belief, associational and or-
ganizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual
rights?and finds them as free, partly free, or not free. Id. PEN report showed
that writers in 75 percent of those countries classified as “free,” compared to
84 percent of writers in those countries classified as “partly free,” and 80 per-
cent of those “not free” countries were either very or somewhat worried about
levels of government surveillance in their own countries. PENAM. CENTER, su-
pra note 14, at 22.
178. As depicted in a synopsis by Privacy International:
The Five Eyes alliance is a secretive, global surveillance ar-
rangement of States comprised of the United States National
Security Agency QBSAPO the United Dingdom’s Government
Communications Fead'uarters QGCF1PO Canada’s CommuL
nications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC), the Aus-
tralian Signals Zirectorate QASZPO and Bew Xealand’s GovL
ernment Communications Security Bureau (GCSB). . . . Un-
der the agreement interception, collection, acquisition, anal-
ysis, and decryption is conducted by each of the State parties
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Writers in “free” countries are now more apt to avoid speakingO
writing, or conducting research on a certain topic for fear of sur-
veillance and its accompanying consequences.179 In accordance
with a fear of government surveillance, writers steer clear of cer-
tain topics in phone conversations or email messages, while also
refraining from conducting internet searches or visiting certain
websites.180 Journalists, in particular, will employ encryption
technology for their correspondences.181 Those who employ less
advanced methods will deliberately create a misleading elec-
tronic trail, or even discard the use of electronic communications
entirely for information of great import.182
in their respective parts of the globe, and all intelligence in-
formation is shared by default.
What is the Five Eyes?, PRIVACY INT’L, https://www.privacyinterna-
tional.org/node/51 (last visited Jan. 16, 2017). Of the 772 writers surveyed in
the PEN study, 171, or approximately 22 percent, lived in the “Five Eyes” coun-
tries. PEN AM. CENTER, supra note 14, at 22. 22 percent of writers within that
sample lived in the United Kingdom at the time of the survey. Id. 84 percent
of writers in the “Five Eyes” alliance countries report that they are either very
or somewhat worried about government surveillance. Id.
179. The PEN report showed that 34 percent of writers in free countries ei-
ther avoided writing on a particular topic, or have considered failing to write
on that topic. Id. Compare this with 27 percent of U.S. writers, who reported
the same in a 2013 PEN survey. Id.
180. 34 percent of writers in free countries have avoided certain topics in
their personal phone calls and email messages, or at least seriously considered
it. Id. at 10. 42 percent of writers living in free countries have refrained from
conducting internet searches and visiting websites that may be considered con-
troversial, or at least seriously considered refraining from such activities. Id.
at 10.
181. Whether encryption is efficient or effective is another story entirely, as
the Human RightsWatch and ACLU report explains that, “[a] significant num-
ber of journalists reported using various forms of encryption software for their
communications with sources or colleagues, including emails, chats, texts, and
phone calls, though it is far from clear how effective these methods are in the
long run.”With Liberty to Monitor All, supra note 161.
182. Journalists will, for example, call many misleading and unrelated
sources before a big story is about to drop in an attempt to mislead any poten-
tial data collection systems Id. at 36. Journalists who are weary of data collec-
tion and tracking are also more likely to prefer phone calls to emails, to prefer
landline phone calls to cell phone calls, and to prefer in-person meetings with
sources to any of the former. Id. at 36.
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IV. AMORE THOROUGH REVIEW OFU.K. SURVEILLANCE LAW
The wide reaching nature of the GCF1’s surveillance operaL
tions, the contested nature of national security as a legitimate
government interest, and the damage done to journalistic free-
dom of expression all highlight that the current approach to com-
munications data acquisition is either poorly executed or funda-
mentally misguided.183 In order to provide a remedy for the sys-
temic problems that egregiously alter journalistic behavior,
there must be systematic solutions.184 The answer is a three-part
solution that attacks the issue on several fronts. First, the legis-
lative framework of metadata collection in the United Kingdom,
with its reliance on now decades-old provisions, must be brought
under fundamental review by the British Parliament.185 This
would entail a top-down analysis of the laws, including those
that have been misused, and a revamp of the legislative scheme
surrounding electronic surveillance. Section 94 was passed in an
era before modern internet existed, RIPA was passed amidst de-
bate and criticism, and both provisions were passed before
metadata could physically trace journalists and their sources.186
The statutory framework demands more than just an update to
be in compliance with Article <I’s guarantee of freedom of eSL
pression.187 This argument is only strengthened by the fact that
the GCHQ had been using the section 94 regime unlawfully for
nearly a decade.188
SecondO because Article 4’s right to privacy linked inextricably
both to Article <I’s freedom of eSpression and the damage done
by metadata collection, any new surveillance system must align
with a new philosophy towards an individual right to privacy.189
Scholars and legal authorities on both sides of the Atlantic have
contemplated the very real possibility that traditional notions of
183. See Donohue, supra note 51, at 1059; Bell et al., supra note 14, at 13; see
also With Liberty to Monitor All, supra note 161.
184. See With Liberty to Monitor All, supra note 161.
185. See Rafi Azim-Khan & Steven P. Farmer, The U.K. Government’s Draft
Codes to Clarify New Legislation on Communications Data Retention and In-




186. See Committee Report, supra note 125, ¶ 136.
187. Id.
188. See Privacy International [2016] H.R.L.R. 21.
189. Donohue, supra note 51, at 1200@01.
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privacy rights may be ill-equipped to keep up with the ongoing
improvement of technology.190 Those who argue the disappear-
ing line between content data and metadata acknowledge this,
and ask whether there is a meaningful difference between the
two in an age where individuals constantly interact with others
through internet and phone communications, and journalists
rely on these communications to keep up with the pace of soci-
ety.191 A personal privacy right in one’s data would mandate
greater care on the part of any government official who sought
to use this data, and also a personal right on behalf of the indi-
vidual, so that he or she may challenge the theft or misuse of his
or her data in court.192 This would at least provide journalists
with a direct method to challenge the taking of their infor-
mation, as well as assuage the fears of journalists and sources
that their personal information will be up for grabs.193
Finally, any new metadata acquisition program should man-
date judicial oversight for any applications for authorization to
collect communications data from journalists and other officials
who hold privileged information.194 This removes the grey area
for authorization applicants to decide, before authorization from
a judge, whether the relevant data is likely to fit within the Code
of Practice’s new procedural guidelines for communication data,
which would be for the express purpose of exposing confidential
sources.195 It is these grey areas where there is the most room
for abuse and error within agencies, such as the GCHQ.196 Re-
moval of such chance of abuse and error would serve to ease the
burden on journalists and their sources and allow for preserva-
tion of freedom of expression.197
190. Id.; see also U.S. v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 413@31 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (discussing the inadequacy of the legal methodologies around the
protection of privacy in a modern society, where the rapid pace of technology
allows government actors easy access to more of citizens’ personal infor-
mation).
191. Committee Report, supra note 125, ¶¶ 136@37; Donohue, supra note 51,
at 1140@41;With Liberty to Monitor All, supra note 161.
192. Donohue, supra note 51, at 1200@01.
193. Bell et al., supra note 14, at 13.
194. See Azim-Khan & Farmer, supra note 185.
195. HOMEOFF., supra note 61, at 45@48.
196. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, supra note 46.
197. Bell et al., supra note 14, at 13; see also With Liberty to Monitor All,
supra note 161.
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CONCLUSION
In a digital world, journalists must remain free to compile in-
formation from sources and to express that information for the
good of society. Where governments can use metadata collection
to trace =ournalists’ activitiesO those journalists are stifled in
their ability to express themselves.198Nations come together and
accede to international conventions, like the ECHR, to protect
fundamental democratic principles like freedom of expression.199
In order to comport with ECHR Article <I’s guarantee of freeL
dom of expression, it is necessary that the statutory framework
under which the GCHQ operates ensures that it does not stifle
the activities of journalists.200 The three-part solution put forth
by this Note can be a big step forward towards a more workable
formulation of British surveillanceK It is only when the UKDK’s
government revamps its legislation, changes its philosophical
views on privacy, and tightens its administrative safeguards,
that the GCF1’s collection of metadata will align with the prin-
ciples and text of Article 10 of the ECHR.201
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